Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713618269 Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model Marcel Van Assen a; Chris Snijders b; Jeroen Weesie c a Tilburg University, The Netherlands b Eindhoven ...
متن کاملCooperation in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Ostracism
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast. putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, ...
متن کاملSocial Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games
It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners' dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, ...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction
This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
متن کاملSequential Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Private Monitoring
We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. The efficient outome can be approximated in any prisoners’ dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of prisoner dilemma games. Our results require that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but do not require very low discounting.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0022-250X,1545-5874
DOI: 10.1080/00222500600549670