Behavioral Health, Provider Payment, And More
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk Selection and Optimal Health Insurance-provider Payment Systems
This article presents a model of the important health-policy dilemmas of risk selection and moral hazard. When providers can increase revenues by selecting favorable risks, capitation or purely prospective payment is unlikely to be optimal. A second best payment system may involve mixed levels of both demandand supply-side cost sharing: consumers may prefer to pay deductibles and co-payments ra...
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Diverse provider payment systems create incentives that affect the quantity and quality of health care services provided. Payments can be based on provider characteristics, which tend to minimize incentives for quality and quantity. Or payments can be based on quantities of services provided and patient characteristics, which provide stronger incentives for quality and quantity. Payments method...
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The mode of payment creates powerful incentives affecting provider behavior and the efficiency, equity and quality outcomes of health finance reforms. This article examines provider incentives as well as administrative costs, and institutional conditions for successful implementation associated with provider payment alternatives. The alternatives considered are budget reforms, capitation, fee-f...
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background equity of access to health and provider payment mechanism in healthcare is a worldwide debated. healthcare reforms are primarily designed to improve productivity, economic efficiency and quality of care; however, an appropriate reimbursement of healthcare providers for services offered to patients and marinating a robust payment mechanism are not elucidated yet. conclusions no single...
متن کاملWORKING PAPER Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment
Many important dimensions of quality health care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. This paper examines how competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple such dimensions or 'tasks' is noncontractible. The framework highlights that an optimal provider payment system, including optimal risk adjustment, shou...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Health Affairs
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0278-2715,1544-5208
DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1476