منابع مشابه
Belief and normativity
The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various v...
متن کاملBelief and Normativity 051007
It seems to be a platitude that belief is governed by a norm of truth. Isn’t the point of belief to believe truths ? Isn’t it a requirement of believing that we should not believe falsehoods? A number of philosophers, however, deny this. Although they recognise that there is an intimate connection between belief and truth, they reject the idea that this connection is normative. Indeed, they tel...
متن کاملRecent Work on the Normativity of Belief
Belief, some say, is normative. To say this is to say, not only that beliefs are subject to normative standards or principles, but that it is part of the essence of belief to be subject to such norms. Call this view, Normativism. Normativism, so characterised, should be distinguished from three related claims. First, that it is part of the concept of belief that it is subject to normative stand...
متن کاملDose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content?
تز هنجارمندیِ محتوایِ ذهنی از مباحث بسیار تأثیرگذار در فلسفۀ ذهن معاصر بوده است. پل بگوسیان به تز هنجارمندیِ محتوا استدلالی بر اساسِ دو پیش فرض ارائه نموده است: اول آنکه باور مفهومی هنجارمند است و دوم آنکه باور نسبت به آرزو اولویتِ مفهومی دارد. الکساندر میلر در مقالۀ اخیر خود استدلال بگوسیان را مورد نقد قرار داده است. برای تقریرِ این نقد، الکساندر میلر استدلال نموده که پیش فرض دومِ استدلالِ بگوسیان...
متن کاملInfinitism, finitude and normativity
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Disputatio
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0873-626X
DOI: 10.2478/disp-2007-0009