Belief and probability: A general theory of probability cores
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Belief and probability: A general theory of probability cores
This paper considers varieties of probabilism capable of distilling paradox-free qualitative doxastic notions (e.g., full belief, expectation, and plain belief) from a notion of probability taken as a primitive. We show that core systems, collections of nested propositions expressible in the underlying algebra, can play a crucial role in these derivations. We demonstrate how the notion of a pro...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0888-613X
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijar.2012.01.002