Belief ascription, metaphor, and intensional identification
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Belief Ascription, Metaphor, and Intensional Identification
This paper discusses the extension of ViewGen, an algorithm derived for belief ascription, to the areas of speech acts, intensional object representation and metaphor. ViewGen represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition-sets known as environments. Environments are convenient, even essential, for addressing important pragmatic issues of reasoning. The paper concentrates...
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ViewGen, an algorithm and program for be lief ascription, represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition-sets known as environments. A way of extending View-Gen to the interpretation of metaphor, and in particular to the comprehension of metaphor within the belief spaces of particular agents, has been described elsewhere. The paper re ports the further refinement and re...
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This article considers the question whether belief ascriptions exhibit context dependence. I first distinguish two potential forms of context dependence in belief ascription. Propositional context dependence (PCD) concerns what the subject believes, whereas attitudinal context dependence (ACD) concerns what it is to believe a proposition. I then discuss three potential sources of PCD and two po...
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There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of b...
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In this paper we discuss the problenl of ascribing beliefs to an agent, given partial knowledge of his beliefs. The particular kind of ascription we are interested in we call explanatory ascription, since it ascribes beliefs to an agent as a means of explaining the beliefs we already know he has. We explore two approaches to explanatory ascription. In the first, we develop a model of belief cal...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cognitive Science
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0364-0213
DOI: 10.1016/0364-0213(91)80015-w