Belief, credence, and faith
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Commentary: Religious credence is not factual belief
Van Leeuwen (2014) claims religious credences are not factual beliefs. He holds that while factual beliefs alone (i) guide behavior in all relevant practical settings, (ii) support inferences between religious credences and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable; religious credences instead (a) have a perceived normative orientation, (b) are open to free elaboration and (c) are vulnerable to special...
متن کاملAccuracy and the Credence-belief Connection
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متن کاملThe elements of medicine: faith, hope and credence.
till I have worked up my patients into a confidence bordering upon certainty, of their probable good effects.” William Osler, the most prominent physician of the 20th Century, remarked: “Faith in us, faith in our drugs and methods, is the great stock in trade of the profession.” In Osler’s iconic textbook (which has guided medical students for over four generations), he said that three factors ...
متن کاملVagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence
If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P , then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is borderline hot, I will h...
متن کاملChance, Credence and Circles
This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. I target Pettigrew’s application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew’s preferred version of the argument might, in one sense, be circular. To support this (but also as an objection in its own right), I argue that Pettigrew’s premises have content t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Religious Studies
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0034-4125,1469-901X
DOI: 10.1017/s0034412518000446