Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments

I'm very pleased to have the opportunity comment on Declan Smithies’ thought-provoking, creative, and ambitious book: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (‘ERC’).1 Unfortunately I can only discuss a small selection issues that it covers here. I'll focus conception belief Smithies defends in Ch. 4–5 (and further 7–10): beliefs as dispositions cause judgments—specifically, one-track phenomenally conscious judgments. has two noteworthy components: first, claim are fully constituted by (conscious) judgments (132).2 Second, phenomenology: there's ‘something it's like’ make judgment (4). Indeed, holds both attitude- content-specific phenomenology—that's say p certain phenomenal character virtue being (rather than, say, desire p) another, interlocking, q). Let's label each component for easy reference: components, well arguments gives their support. It'll emerge, we go, why this is important his overall project ERO. be divided into those support full (one–track disposition & j–phenomenology), specifically j–phenomenology. argues, (best) explains distinction between sub-doxastic states (124–38; §2–3 below). he Accessibilism about justification (148–52, 165–75; §4), which thinks independently motivated (223 ff.). Next argues j–phenomenology contrast cases featuring (140–4; §5) ‘introspective datum’ “we sometimes know introspection alone we're currently making” (145–8; §6). best explanation this, content force. (And our introspective knowledge what believe such [148].) In literature primarily engages, taken representational mental figure proximate causal-psychological (more generally: attitude) regulation action. But controversial unifies respectively, principled metaphysical difference them is, normative (or, some would say: significance is—but that's not quite how matter).3 On might considered ‘the received view’, due Stephen Stich (1978) Gareth Evans (1981), inferentially integrated consciously accessible; neither. Smithies, however, accessibility grounds distinction: marks off from just they're accessible—or, rather: essentially accessible—whereas aren't. How does argue this? First, states; specifically: special role accessibility—glossed judgments—is constitutive belief. And turn, implies one-criterial explanation, terms accessibility, too. (This must strategy since argument otherwise begs question against two-criterial account.) Some clarifications needed. Conscious accessibility. Strictly speaking, says, themselves can't brought consciousness—they're unconscious standing judgments—but contents accessible make. fact thus disposed essential enough meet ‘intermediate criterion’ according “an state consciousness case individuated its experiences” (131). He grants too (be to) experiences, but denies (131–2). Inferential integration. says “our with other sense they combine generate deductive inductive consequences, mutually adjusted avoid logical inconsistency probabilistic incoherence” (126). contrast, ‘don't beliefs’ (or states), nor do sub-systems (125–6; cf. 1978, 506–7). notes also ‘combine [a wide range of] desires produce action’ (126; 1981). integration relative measure: compared beliefs, combine—or better: tend combine—with narrower (perhaps via inferential or ‘inference-like’ transitions) output. supposed salient threshold fall below, which—on received, view—coincides inaccessibility consciousness. typically integrated, (128). difference. operates dominant view difference: (epistemically) rationally evaluable—hence capable justified/unjustified—and, when justified, conferring justification;4 (Cf., “Beliefs subject norms epistemic rationality, whereas not” [123]; “beliefs justify cannot” [131].) doesn't think beliefs: perceptual experiences well, view, despite justifiable. consider possibility category. Of course he's that; want mention different picture—one tempted develop my own work). picture, attitudes evaluable; these confer justification, justified turn. What makes evaluable (although understand differently than Smithies),5 directly revisable—or, more carefully, under direct deliberative leverage: potential unmediated outcomes first-personal deliberation (in functional roles characteristic kinds are). States lack one properties aren't still play justificatory role—e.g., and, controversially, propositional non-negligible degree.6 there like this: that—unlike beliefs—aren't accessible, leverage, significantly attitudes. obviously much brief: taste picture. Suppose grant difference—roughly: justifiable justifiers; grounded understood explained above: states, hand, necessary Zombies representations [that] promiscuous. yet sufficient When patients Capgras delusion spouse been replaced an impostor, […]. At same time, ‘monothematic delusions’ isolated beliefs. (128) Case 1, “Your representation rule r insulated your including conditional if true Chomsky mistaken. [Here] you're judge true, infer This seems irrational, anyway less rational.” 2, inaccessible consciousness, mistaken; [here] r, nevertheless wrong. Again, (129–30) From thought-experiments, draws moral “the rather integration”, [and representation] “isn't unless judgment” (130). worries this. problem invokes heavily under-described, unclear whether given descriptions elaborated so pick out metaphysically possible scenarios. matter much, lights. His stated aim show target features conceptually distinct evaluability goes scenarios where come apart). By simply mean logically analytically/definitionally apart, already clear independent characterizations. chapters clarifies neutral relationship conceptual possibility, means, saying ‘conceivable’) “cannot ruled priori alone” (Ch. 7–9). That's fair enough, limits argument's import, invites response belief/sub-doxastic was never put forward—and isn't charitably interpreted—as necessary, (at most) necessary. mere conceivability philosophical zombies syndrome type describes bear read intended way. One latter example supports stronger conclusion (since actual syndrome). According states—viz., impostor-themed delusions. note likely false all world. compatible presence interference mechanisms—e.g., neuropathological abnormalities, brute external force—which obstruct transitions enter. (Otherwise, suggestion non-starter.) delusional misidentification syndromes widely, plausibly, rooted complex impairments normal physiological and/or psychological functions.7 notion mechanism at normal/abnormal function distinction) understood, cases.8 explanatory utility all, then phenomena prime candidates it. Perhaps agents without consequential impairments, psychologically organized stipulated Smithies. hard see reflection case, bare-bones description provides, could settle that. similar reservations 1: truly insulated—rather ‘cut off’ pathways mechanisms? Note, moreover, detail affect failure draw relevant inference irrational not. There natural ways imaginatively filling description, involving interference, does—loosely put: mechanisms exculpate, don't justify. However, asked imagine exhibits specified inertia proprietary place (normal human) cognitive architecture—like traditional paradigms arguably do—the clear. I, one, find implausible any rational least ostensibly deontic) mandate operations unable perform substantially reconfiguring minds. point bears (intended versions of) account uses foil. Note 1 particular—and verdict depicted behavior irrational—is crucial, establish wholly takes most promising competing models (134–9; §5). turns (§6). present aspect view. Next: suppose agent's irrational. exactly accessibility? Reflection cases, shows “there consistency (and/or coherence) constraints rationality combinations states”, “[e]pistemic requires other, require states” (129). It's entirely what's going architectural causal-functional feature—being governed by, satisfying, ‘structural’ A principle integrated—i.e., enter right sort, sort—without satisfying structural (rather: member set do), even them. Conversely, fluke, divine intervention, evolutionary design, although insulated. Moreover, considerable independence constraints, ‘justified-ness’; restrict combined, irrespective status.9 So good thoughts here spelled detail. relations integration, evaluability? criticizes accounts belief—including ‘multitrack’ “to bodily actions acts (134). critique (134–7) apply views include broadly inferential, overtly behavioral, dispositions. views—with exception account, among features. plausible constitutes (also) includes specific dispositions: created, revised, eliminated distinctive ways—e.g., (representations considerations pertain truth falsity desirability true). rightly points perfectly sensitive evidence” (137). suggesting strikes me someone count believing wanting hoping) having slightest tendency (re)adjust stand light kind qualifies evidence reasons—at absent interference. spell informative comes to, pinpoint limiting suspect optimistic done.10 another no disposition—inferential otherwise—is individually belief: rather, clusters version disjunctions (e.g., either judgments, regulated ‘truth-aiming’ ways), minimum number additional cluster required. version, will do, provided sufficiently many. hybrid indeed essential, large subset particularly attractive me, hear wrong competitors account. one–track figures Accessibilism. thesis facts justification—e.g., you p—“are strongly luminous [necessarily] always position obtain” (226). because determined (facts about) introspectively luminous: know, through introspection, (148–9). This, justification-determining individuated: characters, token characters. ensure luminosity? account—the ‘Simple Theory’—of evidentially (155–8): that, e.g., ‘immediate, infallible, indubitable, indefeasible, safe’ (introspective) reason p, Accessibilism, Simple Theory introspection. feature (allegedly etc.) reasons tracking yes: luminosity (not but) It character/s. let's look little closer claim, j–phenomenology, before returning Theory. To recap: provide justification; category distinctive, content-specific, phenomenology ‘we alone’ judging, believe—and, indeed, (given ‘cognitive experience’ judgment, belief), required true. integral vindication […] subjects entertain proposition, judges proposition while suspends judgment. Alternatively, false. content. (141) expects readers agree (“Surely making causally, constitutively, experience” [141].) proceeds criticize sensory concludes provides (141–4). Here's grant: causal experience. What, any, partly depends judged—not phenomenology, be, upsetting gratifying surprising contents, totally banal others. Judgments trigger various processes characteristic, typical, ‘feels’—e.g., angst surprise self-directed satisfaction, relief puzzlement, feelings subjective confidence understanding.11 phenomena, may regularly associated (for subjects, contexts). As far tell, nothing ‘it's themselves, isolation concomitant phenomena. Presumably mind between, judging feeling understanding relief, feeling. contrast? afraid fail recognize experience imagination—just particular therein correlates all-and-only raining, children scars medals, More guidance—perhaps identifying details differentiate close vicinity—would helpful. There's puzzling dialectical standoff precisely point, larger debate contributes.12 participants able isolate character—of, thoughts, so-called ‘intellectual seemings’—in Others so. us camp, search up nothing—at rate, plausibly attributed familiar, emotional, accompany process. diagnosis disparate self-reports humans enjoy (of type/s). armchair, surprising. Another systematically miss, misidentify, character; alternatively, opposing camp hallucinate misidentify target. too, perhaps tolerable—except stringent security (like Smithies’). end addressing datum (hence Accessibilism). datum, believe, (145, 148). explanations take form Theory, necessarily ‘provide themselves’ (155); itself (maximally secure) are. Given assumptions (156–7), underwrites luminous. fact—any fact—a anything? (all-and-only) states—including dispositions—provide reasons? Relatedly: work doing, Why required—or relevant—to explaining things when, words, “you all”, “[t]he act neither sufficient.” (180). rephrase: p—i.e., p—is status? over shoots head kind) disposed. difference? doing belief? great get clarity