Bertrand oligopoly revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1026-0226,1607-887X
DOI: 10.1155/s1026022601000012