Between Populism and Technocracy: How National Executives in Bulgaria and Serbia Manipulate EU Rule of Law Conditionality

This article explores how national executives in Serbia and Bulgaria address European Union (EU) rule of law conditionality by framing it within the populism/technocracy dichotomy. The remains one main problems EU relations with two countries. While acknowledging nuances pre- post-enlargement Europeanisation, this technocratic populist narratives exploited their interactions domestic public. Rather than positioning current unequivocally either as or technocratic, we argue that political elites act strategically using both techniques towards publics when explaining interaction EU. We explore extent type executive behaviour is determined countries’ formally different status. look for levels possible similarity distinction cases/countries stemming from membership status, our findings confirm existence strategic defensive applied public countries aim strategy to mitigate impact pressure secure persistence existing shortcomings process integration. Interestingly, research did not identify substantial status