Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Replicator Dynamics with Frequency Dependent Stage Games
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In such an evolutionary game, the payoffs of a strategy at any point in time are functions of the strategy shares given by the players’ strategy choices at that time. This framework is suited to model feedback effects between population variables and individual incentives, indirect network effects,...
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The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally and by numerical simulation, that it leaves the replicator dynamics invariant with respect to affine transformations of the game payoff matrix. We then show ...
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Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that those individuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency in the population grows. Wh...
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Models of evolutionary dynamics are often approached via the replicator equation, which in its standard form is given by ẋi = xi ( fi (x)−φ) , i = 1, . . . ,n, where xi is the frequency, or relative abundance, of strategy i, fi is its fitness, and φ = ∑i=1 xi fi is the average fitness. A game-theoretic aspect is introduced to the model via the payoff matrix A, where Ai, j is the expected payoff...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.07.003