Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions
We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy’s complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions. JEL classification codes: D44, C73
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/338748