Block Trading, Ownership Structure, and the Value of Corporate Votes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value
The nonlinear relationship between corporate value (Tobin's Q) and managerial ownership is well documented. This has commonly been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a more complex structure for the corporate value { managerial ownership function, which accounts for the e®ect...
متن کاملthe underlying structure of language proficiency and the proficiency level
هدف از انجام این تخقیق بررسی رابطه احتمالی بین سطح مهارت زبان خارجی (foreign language proficiency) و ساختار مهارت زبان خارجی بود. تعداد 314 زبان آموز مونث و مذکر که عمدتا دانشجویان رشته های زبان انگلیسی در سطوح کارشناسی و کارشناسی ارشد بودند در این تحقیق شرکت کردند. از لحاظ سطح مهارت زبان خارجی شرکت کنندگان بسیار با هم متفاوت بودند، (75 نفر سطح پیشرفته، 113 نفر سطح متوسط، 126 سطح مقدماتی). کلا ...
15 صفحه اولOwnership structure and corporate performance
This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consisten...
متن کاملTrading Votes for Votes . ∗ A Decentralized Matching
We study vote trading—trading of votes for votes—through the tools of the matching literature. Decentralized vote trading is modeled via an algorithm that executes a sequence of binding, myopic, strictly improving pair-wise trades. We show that with binary alternatives, an odd number of voters, and separable preferences, the sequence always converges to a stable vote allocation—a distribution o...
متن کاملTrading Votes for Votes: An Experimental Study∗
Trading votes for votes is believed to be ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little of its properties. We return to this old question with a laboratory experiment and a simple theoretical framework. We posit a family of minimally rational trading rules such that pairs of voters can exchange votes when mutually advantageous. Such rules always lead to stable vote allo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.521482