Booms and Banking Crises
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credit booms, financial fragility and banking crises
Using a new country-level panel database, we explore effect of capital inflow surges, credit booms and financial fragility on the probability of banking crises. We find that booms increase the probability of a crisis only in relatively fragile financial systems. © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/lice...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/685475