BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND TRAFFIC BEHAVIOR MODELING

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshu

سال: 2001

ISSN: 0289-7806,1882-7187

DOI: 10.2208/jscej.2001.688_5