Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9315-9