Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and industrial structure of a country. We show that corruption can coexist at macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries similar development are often characterized by very different structures: implications this has Welfare our model point toward encouraging policies support small business sector an economy flexible meant to suppress regulation enough firms.
منابع مشابه
Bribes , Lobbying , and Development
When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802892