Broken promises: solvency issues for defined benefit superannuation funds
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Minimum funding ratios for defined-benefit pension funds*
We compute minimum nominal funding ratios for defined-benefit (DB) plans based on the expected utility that can be achieved in a defined-contribution (DC) pension scheme. Using Monte Carlo simulation, expected utility is computed for three different specifications of utility : power utility,mean-shortfall, andmean-downside deviation.Depending on risk aversion and the level of sophistication ass...
متن کاملOptimal Investment Policies for Defined Benefit Pension Funds
This paper analyzes optimal investment policies for pension funds of a defined benefit (DB) type. The nature of a DB fund induces a natural modeling of preferences being of the mean-downside risk type. With compensation for inflation as an explicit goal of a pension fund, a natural reference point for the risk measure is the future (indexed) value of the liabilities. Results are presented for d...
متن کاملDiversification and Risk in Superannuation Funds
This paper deals with the question of which factors have the highest impact on the wealth outcome at retirement in a superannuation context. We focus on the last 10 years prior to retirement as these are the most crucial in determining the wealth outcome. We evaluate the performance of different lifecycle investment strategies for superannuation funds under different scenarios of market conditi...
متن کاملOptimal risk management in defined benefit stochastic pension funds
We consider a continuous time dynamic pension funding model in a defined benefit plan of an employment system. The benefits liabilities are random, given by a geometric Brownian process. Three different situations are studied regarding the investment decisions taken by the sponsoring employer: in the first, the fund is invested at a constant, risk-free rate of interest; in the second, the promo...
متن کاملBroken Promises: An Experiment
We test whether promises per se are effective in enhancing cooperative behavior in a form of trust game. In a new treatment, rather than permitting free-form messages, we instead allow only a bare promise-only message to be sent (or not). We find that bare promises are much less effective in achieving good social outcomes than free-form messages; in fact, bare promise-only messages lead to beha...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Law, Probability and Risk
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1470-8396,1470-840X
DOI: 10.1093/lpr/mgm002