Browser-Based DDoS Attacks without Javascript

Cashing Out the Great Cannon? On Browser-Based DDoS Attacks and Economics

The Great Cannon DDoS attack has shown that HTML/JavaScript can be used to launch HTTP-based DoS attacks. In this paper, we identify options that could allow the implementation of the general idea of browser-based DDoS botnets and review ways how attackers can acquire bots (e.g., typosquatting and malicious ads). We then assess the DoS impact of browser features and show that at least three Jav...

Browser-Based Attacks on Tor

This paper describes a new attack on the anonymity of web browsing with Tor. The attack tricks a user’s web browser into sending a distinctive signal over the Tor network that can be detected using traffic analysis. It is delivered by a malicious exit node using a man-in-themiddle attack on HTTP. Both the attack and the traffic analysis can be performed by an adversary with limited resources. W...

Mitigating DDoS attacks with cluster-based filtering

Performance of a Browser-Based JavaScript Bandwidth Test

An existing browser-based bandwidth test written in JavaScript was modified for the purpose of further data collection by the CyberTiger Project. The speed test’s results were compared with those of iperf, a standard internet performance measurement tool, under various network constraints. Introduction Because the browser-based PHP speed test [1] used by the CyberTiger project provided inaccura...

Resistance Is Not Futile: Detecting DDoS Attacks without Packet Inspection

Packets in anonymous networks are fully protected. Therefore, traditional methods relying on packet header and higher layer information do not work to detect Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks in anonymous networks. In this paper we propose to use observable statistics at routers that need no packet inspection to infer the presence of an attack. We propose packet resistance as a metri...