Bubbles and Information: An Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bubbles and Information: An Experiment
We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in mark...
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History contains many colorful examples where speculative trade in some commodity or financial asset generated a phase of rapidly increasing prices, followed by a sudden collapse (see, e.g., Edward Chancellor, 1999, or Charles Kindleberger, 2001). One famous case cited by many economists (see Peter Garber, 2000, pp. 127–31, for references) is the Dutch “tulipmania” of the 1630s. The prices of c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1365