Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox

نویسندگان

چکیده

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the target logical principles underlying reasoning from sentence paradoxical conclusion that both true and false. In contrast these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources devise a distinctively epistemological approach paradox. this paper, I mobilise argue what epistemologists call contradiction with one’s own words. situate my argument in works of Dignāga Dharmakīrti show how

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Australasian Journal of Philosophy

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1471-6828', '1470-6828', '0004-8402']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172592