Bundling and Firm Reputation

Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration∗

We study effects of horizontal integration on firm reputation. In an environment where customers observe only imperfect signals about firms’ effort/quality choices, firms cannot maintain reputations of high quality and earn quality premia forever. Even when firms are choosing high quality/effort, there is always a possibility that a bad signal is observed. In this case, firms must give up their...

Firm reputation and applicant pool characteristics

Scholars have suggested that a firm’s reputation can provide it with a competitive advantage by attracting more, and possibly higher-caliber, applicants. No research has actually investigated this relationship, however, in large part because researchers have not assessed applicant pool characteristics but instead have measured applicants’ intentions. Therefore, we conducted two studies to inves...

Bundling Revisited: Substitute Products and Inter-Firm Discounts

This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, …rms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Separate …rms often have a unilateral incentive to o¤er inter-…rm bundle discounts, alth...

Consumer networks and firm reputation: a first experimental investigation

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbors about their private experiences with different sellers. We find that such information exchange fosters firms' incentives for reputation building and...

Firm celebrity, Reputation and Performance: a Social Media Perspective