Bureaucracy, Clientalism and Corruption in Russia

Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption∗

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are supposed to grant licences to firms that satisfy certain requirements. Firms have to invest into satisfying these requirements. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they give the licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. Some firms prefer to buy the licence rather than to invest and satisfy ...

Weberian bureaucracy and corruption prevention

Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape ¬リニ

a r t i c l e i n f o Intermediaries that assist individuals and firms with the government bureaucracy are common in developing countries. Although such bureaucracy intermediaries are, anecdotally, linked with corruption and welfare losses, few formal analyses exist. We introduce a model in which a government license can benefit individuals. We study the net license gain when individuals get th...

Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption in Postwar Italy1

This paper examines the relationship between the legislature and the public administration in postwar Italy (understood as the period from about 1948 through 1994). Italian public administration is normally characterized as poorly designed and ine±cient. A principal-agent framework would lead one to believe that political control of the bureaucracy was inadequate in Italy, and that extensive bu...

Corruption in Procurement and Shadow Campaign Financing: Evidence from Russia∗

Using objective micro-level data on tunneling for the population of large Russian firms, we document pervasive corruption in public procurement. Corruption exhibits political cycle: firms with procurement revenue provide shadow financing for regional elections. Using variation in quality of tax inspectors as a source of variation in tunneling, we show that political connections are not the only...