Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Constitutional Political Economy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1043-4062,1572-9966
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09280-8