منابع مشابه
Can Mechanism Designers Exploit Buyers’ Market Information
Competing mechanism games can have many equilibrium outcomes when mechanism designers can use mechanisms which ask agents to report deviations. Existing folk theorems assume agents have perfect information about designers’ mechanisms, that they can costlessly convey very complex messages, and that they use weakly dominated strategies. This paper addresses two questions. The first is whether the...
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We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Chemical Education
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0021-9584,1938-1328
DOI: 10.1021/ed063p827