منابع مشابه
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
As introduced in Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015), Fair Division refers to the general problem of fairly dividing a common resource among agents having different —and sometimes antagonistic— interests in the resource. But under this general term one can actually gather a cluster of very different problems, all calling for different solution concepts: after all, one can easily figure out that we canno...
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This paper uses a New Monetarist framework to study the trade of indivisible goods with divisible money in a frictional market. We first derive conditions under which stationary equilibrium exists, and then show that if equilibrium exits, it is unique. The uniqueness result is due to the commitment and coordination nature of the pricing mechanisms. Money is superneutral in the model with genera...
متن کاملFair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across elements. Our model generalizes existing frameworks such as fair public decision making and participatory budgeting. We study a groupwise fairness notion called t...
متن کاملManipulation Games in Economics with Indivisible Goods
In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a nite set of indivisible goods among a group of agents when monetary compensations are possible. In the rst part of the paper we consider the case where each agent receives, at most, one indivisible good. We prove that the set of equilibrium allocations of any direct revelation game associated ...
متن کاملFair Division of Indivisible Goods under Risk
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible objects to n agents having additive preferences over them. In this paper we propose an extension of this classical problem, where each object can possibly be in bad condition (e.g broken), in which case its actual value is zero. We assume that the central authority in charge of allocating the objects does not know beforehand th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00015-8