Cache-Timing Attacks on RSA Key Generation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cache-timing attacks on AES
This paper demonstrates complete AES key recovery from known-plaintext timings of a network server on another computer. This attack should be blamed on the AES design, not on the particular AES library used by the server; it is extremely difficult to write constant-time high-speed AES software for common general-purpose computers. This paper discusses several of the obstacles in detail.
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Statement I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own work and that to the best of my knowledge it is original, except where indicated by references to other authors. Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich meine Masterarbeit eigenständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt, sowie Zitate kenntlich gemacht habe.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2569-2925
DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2019.i4.213-242