Cache-timing attacks without a profiling phase
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Remote Cache-Timing Attack without Learning Phase
Theoretically secure cryptographic algorithms can be vulnerable to attacks due to their implementation flaws, which disclose side-channel information about the secret key. Bernstein’s attack is a well known cache-timing attack which uses execution time as the side-channel. The major drawback of this attack is that it needs an identical target machine to perform its learning phase where the atta...
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Camellia, as the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE, is the most secure block cipher of the world. In 2003, Tsunoo proposed a Cache Attack using a timing of CPU cache, successfully recovered Camellia-128 key within 2 plaintexts and 35 minutes. In 2004, IKEDA YOSHITAKA made some further improvements on Tsunoo’s attacks, recovered Camellia-128 key within 2 plaintexts and 22 minutes. A...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: TURKISH JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING & COMPUTER SCIENCES
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1300-0632,1303-6203
DOI: 10.3906/elk-1711-359