Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
Then, the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. In fact, for each correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated learning rule that the players can use which results in their playing this correlated equilibrium in the limit. Thus, the statistical concept of a calibration is strongly related to the game theoretic concept of correlated equilibrium. Journal of Economic ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0595