Can the Integrated Information Theory Explain Consciousness from Consciousness Itself?

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of they arrive at, but also with respect to how understand their starting point. Some approaches begin experimentally gathered data, whereas others phenomenologically data. this paper, I analyse most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely Integrated Information Theory (IIT) consciousness, fits its data explanatory hypotheses. First, show that driven hit an roadblock, since we cannot tell, at present stage, which model is best. Then, IIT’s approach implies a self-evidencing explanation according can be explained by from itself. claim IIT take advantage virtuous circularity reasoning, it faces data-fitting issue somehow similar faced experiment-driven approaches: are given enough information decide whether hypotheses employs explain phenomenological fact call problem “the problem” for IIT, and after introducing it, propose possible way solve it.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of Philosophy and Psychology

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1878-5158', '1878-5166']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00653-x