Can They Beat the Cournot Equilibrium? Learning with Memory and Convergence to Equilibria in a Cournot Oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities
The paper considers an imitation dynamic in the context of Cournot oligopoly. The pure ”imitate-the-best” behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior to imperfect imitation in the two-stage model with capacities and prices. This variation in the imitative behavior improves efficiency and makes the Cournot-Nash equilibri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computational Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0927-7099,1572-9974
DOI: 10.1007/s10614-012-9349-4