Carrier-phase and IMU based GNSS Spoofing Detection for Ground Vehicles

This paper develops, implements, and validates a powerful single-antenna carrier-phase-based test to detect Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) spoofing attacks on ground vehicles equipped with low-cost inertial measurement unit (IMU). Increasingly-automated require precise positioning that is resilient unusual natural or accidental events secure against deliberate attack. paper’s detection technique capitalizes the carrier-phase fixed-ambiguity residual cost produced by well-calibrated carrier-phase-differential GNSS (CDGNSS) estimator tightly coupled IMU. The sensitive at sub-centimeter-level discrepancies between measured carrier phase values predicted prior measurements dynamics model, which based IMU vehicle constraints. Such will arise in attack due attacker’s practical inability predict centimeter-amplitude movement caused roadway irregularities. effectiveness of developed method evaluated data captured vehicle-mounted sensor suite Austin, Texas. dataset includes both consumer- industrial-grade diverse set multipath environments (open sky, shallow urban, deep urban). Artificial worst-case injected into are detected within two seconds.