Cartel Stability by a Margin
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Trade liberalization and cartel stability *
Manuscript No: #8529, Acceptance date: November 30, 1999 Trade liberalization and cartel stability* Kjell Erik Lommerud Lars Sørgard RRH: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND CARTEL STABILITY LRH: Kjell Erik Lommerud and Lars Sørgard Abstract Can reduced trade barriers promote a collusive understanding about not exporting into each others domestic markets? Reduced trade costs increase the short-run gains f...
متن کاملCartel Stability and Economic Integration
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other’s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weak...
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The stability of imperfect cartel, i.e. a market with both cartel firms (k-firms) and noncartel or fringe firms (j-firms), has a long research history. Selten (1973) was the first to argue that four firms in a market are a few while six are too many. Ten years later, D'Aspremont et al (1983), modelled the behavior of j-firms as price-takers. Donsimoni et al (1986) and Daskin (1989), based on D'...
متن کاملCartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities
To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. For a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities must be ‘low’. The domain reduces for which the strictest IC constraint is binding if (i) any per-period detection probabi...
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The condition is derived for Friedman’s trigger strategy to sustain a collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium given subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority’s ability of succesfully disolving the illegal cartel.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3142025