CASH HOLDING, GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUE
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value∗
We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholderoriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakehol...
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An impressive volume of careful empirical studies finds evidence that the strength of firms’ corporate governance tends to be positively correlated with their financial performance; that is, firms that score higher on some measure of governance tend to outperform those which score worse. These findings are a puzzle insofar as we expect those who decide how a firm is organized, including its cor...
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Agency problems are an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. For a sample of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries, we find that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in countries with good shareholder protection. In addition, when shareholder protection is poor, factors that generally drive the ne...
متن کاملCash Holdings and Corporate Governance –
In this paper, we provide new and complementing international evidence on the relation between cash holdings, corporate governance, and firm value. Our sample consists of a crosssection of 1,875 firms from 46 countries in 2007. We construct eight different measures of firm-level corporate governance based on 64 individual governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI)....
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Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Jurnal Dinamika Manajemen
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2337-5434,2086-0668
DOI: 10.15294/jdm.v7i2.8196