Causal Judgment in Attributive and Explanatory Contexts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Explanatory Judgment, Probability, and Abductive Inference
Abductive reasoning assigns special status to the explanatory power of a hypothesis. But how do people make explanatory judgments? Our study clarifies this issue by asking: (i) How does the explanatory power of a hypothesis cohere with other cognitive factors? (ii) How does probabilistic information affect explanatory judgments? In order to answer these questions, we conducted an experiment wit...
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Much research (e.g., Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989) has emphasized the critical role that domain knowledge plays in categorization judgments. Recent instantiations of this view (e.g., Ahn, et al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2001) have focused on characterizing how causal knowledge supports categorization decisions. We suggest that a more satisfactory account of categorization can be ...
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A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends ...
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Introduction: Converging evidence suggests that both emotional and cognitive processes are critically involved in moral judgment, and may be mediated by discrete parts of the prefrontal cortex. The current study aimed at investigating the mediatory effect of right Frontopolar Cortex (rFPC) on the way that emotions affect moral judgments. Methods: Six adult patients affected by rFPC and 10 hea...
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Explanations have no bound in principle, but in practice, people prefer explanations that are complete (Zemla et al., 2017), and the explanations that they generate are bounded (Miyake, 1986). We tested reasoners’ ability to assess whether some explanations are incomplete. Participants in three experiments received explanations, i.e., chains of causal events, e.g., A causes B causes C. Their ta...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Law and Contemporary Problems
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0023-9186
DOI: 10.2307/1191623