Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Conservatism: Theory with an Application to Iran
New monetary literatures widely concentrates on the importance of institutional arrangements in the effectiveness of monetary policy. The debate regarding the optimal institutional design of central banks, independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most important ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deal with the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650