Central bank independence and economic performance in eastern Europe

Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Conservatism: Theory with an Application to Iran

New monetary literatures widely concentrates on the importance of institutional arrangements in the effectiveness of monetary policy. The debate regarding the optimal institutional design of central banks, independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most important ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deal with the...

Central and Eastern Europe: Floods

affected persons in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, was fully covered. The generous response of donors, backed up by a similar gesture from local communities, allowed all aspects of the operation (emergency relief, post-emergency relief, and rehabilitation) to be effected. Problems with communications and lack of Disaster Preparedness know-how were surmounted and valuable less...

Central Bank Independence and Macro- prudential Regulation

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social o...

Debt, inflation and central bank independence

Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Ove...

Central Bank Independence and Financing Government Spending*