منابع مشابه
Instability of Centralized Markets∗
Centralized markets reduce the costs of search for buyers and sellers. Their ‘thickness’ increases the chance of order execution at competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to consolidate, some markets, securities markets and online advertising being the most notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is an inevitable feature of any centralized marke...
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The ability to engineer real wage cuts in centralized labor markets has depended on exchange rate interventions. This paper provides some structure to the question of how a monetary union would a¤ect the connection between bargaining structure and macroeconomic performance. The results indicate that the precautionary saving motive in anticipation of transitory terms of trade shock is signi...ca...
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In this paper, the common centralized DEA models are extended to the bi-level centralized resource allocation (CRA) models based on revenue efficiency. Based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, the bi-level CRA model is reduced to a one-level mathematical program subject to complementarity constraints (MPCC). A recurrent neural network is developed for solving this one-level mathematica...
متن کاملTransmission loss allocation in bilateral or multilateral transaction-based markets
In this paper, the problem of transmission loss allocation has been studied and a new method for loss allocation in transaction-based markets has been proposed. To further this end, first transmission line loss equations were used with respect to bus injected currents. The share of each bus from the mentioned transmission line losses was determined. Then, this method was applied to the total ne...
متن کاملIncentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent overall stable matchings. In oneto-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.002