CEO career horizons and earnings quality in family firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asian Review of Accounting
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1321-7348
DOI: 10.1108/ara-02-2019-0029