CEO Risk Incentives and Real Earnings Management
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Board Committees , CEO Compensation , and Earnings Management ∗
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Business and Management
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1833-8119,1833-3850
DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v11n3p37