CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions

Outside Versus Inside Bonds

When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist — borrow or sell assets. We compare the welfare properties of these options in two economies: in one, agents can borrow (issue inside bonds) and in the other they can sell government bonds (outside bonds). All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy ...

CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms

Outside Directors and Ceo Turnover

‘this paper examines the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside aud outside directors and CEO resignations. CEO resignations are predicted using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance. There is a stronger association between prior performance and the prhability of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider-d...

CEO Compensation and Company Performance

This paper examines the relationship of CEO pay and company performance for 280 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for a period from 2006 through 2009. The time frame of the study is a period after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and after the SEC approval of the corporate governance rules affecting executive pay for New York Stock Exchange companies. I find there to be a positi...

Inside versus outside ownership: a political theory of the firm

If contracting within the firm is incomplete, managers will expend resources on trying to appropriate a share of the surplus that is generated. We show that outside ownership may alleviate the deadweight losses associated with such costly distributional conflict, even if all it does is add another level of conflict. In case managers have to be provided with incentives to make firm-specific inve...