CEOs´ monetary incentives and performance of Mexican firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Board role duties and composition
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2312-2722,1810-8601
DOI: 10.22495/cbv13i1p4