Certificate-Based Encryption Resilient to Continual Leakage in the Standard Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Certificate-Based Encryption Resilient to Key Leakage
Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is an important class of public key encryption but the existing schemes are secure only under the premise that the decryption key (or private key) and master private key are absolutely secret. In fact, a lot of side channel attacks and cold boot attacks can leak secret information of a cryptographic system. In this case, the security of the cryptographic syste...
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In recent years, there has been a major effort to design cryptographic schemes that remain secure even if part of the secret key is leaked. This is due to a recent proliferation of side channel attacks which, through various physical means, can recover part of the secret key. We explore the possibility of achieving security even with continual leakage, i.e., even if some information is leaked e...
متن کاملLeakage-Resilient Cryptography in the Standard Model
We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if arbitrary (adversely chosen) information on the internal state of S is leaked during computation. This captures all possible side-channel attacks on S where the amount of information leaked in a given period is bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large, in particular much larger than the internal state of S. The only other ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Security and Communication Networks
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1939-0114,1939-0122
DOI: 10.1155/2020/1492681