Certificate-based encryption resilient to key leakage
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Certificate-Based Encryption Resilient to Key Leakage
Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is an important class of public key encryption but the existing schemes are secure only under the premise that the decryption key (or private key) and master private key are absolutely secret. In fact, a lot of side channel attacks and cold boot attacks can leak secret information of a cryptographic system. In this case, the security of the cryptographic syste...
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The literature on leakage-resilient cryptography contains various leakage models that provide different levels of security. In this work, we consider the bounded leakage and the continual leakage models. In the bounded leakage model (Akavia et al. – TCC 2009), it is assumed that there is a fixed upper bound L on the number of bits the attacker may leak on the secret key in the entire lifetime o...
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Blinding is a popular and well-known countermeasure to protect public-key cryptosystems against side-channel attacks. The high level idea is to randomize an exponentiation in order to prevent multiple measurements of the same operation on different data, as such measurements might allow the adversary to learn the secret exponent. Several variants of blinding have been proposed in the literature...
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Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture sidechannel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. Inspired by recent side-channel attacks, especially the “cold boot attacks”, Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC ’09...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Systems and Software
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0164-1212
DOI: 10.1016/j.jss.2015.05.066