Change in Risk and Bargaining Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equitable Risk Allocation in Construction Projects: Fuzzy Bargaining Game Approach
An equitable risk allocation between contracting parties plays a vital role in enhancing the performance of the project. This research presents a new quantitative risk allocation approach by integrating fuzzy logic and bargaining game theory. Owing to the imprecise and uncertain nature of players’ payoffs at different risk allocation strategies, fuzzy logic is implemented to determine the value...
متن کاملequitable risk allocation in construction projects: fuzzy bargaining game approach
an equitable risk allocation between contracting parties plays a vital role in enhancing the performance of the project. this research presents a new quantitative risk allocation approach by integrating fuzzy logic and bargaining game theory. owing to the imprecise and uncertain nature of players’ payoffs at different risk allocation strategies, fuzzy logic is implemented to determine the value...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2255556