Characteristic Function and Time Consistency for Two-Stage Games with Network Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2227-7390
DOI: 10.3390/math8010038