Charitable asymmetric bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
We consider standard auction models when bidders’ identities are not -or partiallyobserved by the econometrician. First, we adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and we explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically id...
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The theoretical literature on asymmetric first-price auctions has focused mainly on settings with either (1) exactly two bidders or (2) an arbitrary number of bidders with types in a common support. Even though closed form solutions are typically impossible, there is enough structure in the problem to guide both empirical work and numerical solutions or simulations. However, casual observation ...
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Existing work on auctions assumes that bidders are symmetric in their types — they have the same risk attitude and their valuations are drawn from the same distribution. This is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where highly heterogeneous bidders with different risk attitudes and widely varying valuation distributions commonly compete with each other. Using computational service auct...
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We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for any given first price handicap auction, there is a simple second-price design which dominates it. This generalizes a previous result for the case of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12406