منابع مشابه
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Article history: Received 16 February 2009 Received in revised form 25 August 2010 Accepted 25 August 2010 Available online 1 December 2010 When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is possible to use the contemplated donation as a bargaining chip to induce other parties interested in the charity to donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of matching offers, where one ...
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Charities frequently rely on high-priced professional solicitors but donors seem unaware. To understand this, we propose an agency-based theory of fundraising. We show that trading off its incentive cost, the charity optimally hires a sufficiently "efficient" solicitor and offers him a high percentage of the donations collected, implying a high price of giving. Thus, if, as required by law, don...
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In this paper, we further generalize the technique for constructing the normal (or positive definite) and skew-Hermitian splitting iteration method for solving large sparse nonHermitian positive definite system of linear equations. By introducing a new splitting, we establish a class of efficient iteration methods, called positive definite and semi-definite splitting (PPS) methods, and prove th...
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The voluntary service not-for-profit sector (VSNFP), also called the charitable sector, is a neglected setting for knowledge management research. It is also an area with distinctive characteristics that preclude direct importation of knowledge management approaches developed for the for-profit sector. In this paper, the authors adapt a model for examining knowledge management research issues to...
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We study how competition among charities affects individuals’ giving behavior. We characterize a situation where a higher rebate subsidy shifts donations from one charity to another and increases total donations. We conduct two experiments: (i) individualized charitable giving where free riding incentives are shut down; and (ii) multi-donor charitable giving. We derive the demand for giving at ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register
سال: 1933
ISSN: 0749-9833
DOI: 10.2307/3308275