Cheap Talk Comparisons in Multi-issue Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cheap Talk, Neologisms, and Bargaining
This paper shows that in some bargaining games, cheap talk must matter: the unique neologism-proof equilibrium involves informative talk. A simple tradeoff makes both equilibrium talk and neologisms credible: by saying that he is interested in trading, the buyer encourages the seller to continue to bargain but receives poorer terms of trade if trade occurs. All tj^pes of both parties are (weakl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.315083