Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cheap talk when interests conflict.
Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank out...
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Communication in practice typically occurs through multiple channels, not all of which permit costless misrepresentation of private information. Accordingly, I study a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982), but allow for communication through both cheap talk and messages on a second dimension where misreporting is costly. Using a forward-induction refine...
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Misrepresenting private information is often costly, for technological, legal, or psychological reasons. I develop a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS), but with a convex cost of lying or misreporting. There are three main results. First, I prove that a sequence of monotone equilibria converges to a CS equilibrium as the cost of misreporting shri...
متن کاملCheap talk communication with dynamic information searching
We build an agent-based cheap talk communication model with dynamic information searching behavior. In this model, agent communicates with its neighbors freely to get true or false information. Moreover, the uninformed receivers has ability to break up one link of his neighbor who is considered as a dishonest sender and searches for a new neighbor in the market. We study the impacts of the accu...
متن کاملCheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence
Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the pair. In the field, people may engage in cheap talk and subsequently learn their payoffs, but frequently...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1123-y