Children's altruism in public good and dictator experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision
We present a model of altruistically-minded– yet rational– players contributing to a public good. A key feature is the tension between altruism and crowding-out effects. We present three main results: (1) More altruistic behaviour often reduces social welfare; (2) It is almost always optimal for a player to act more selfishly than her true preference; (3) A player’s optimal altruistic commitmen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0095-2583,1465-7295
DOI: 10.1093/ei/38.1.95